The China's Rise as an International Trading Power by Christopher Edmonds et al.
The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center
in 1960 to foster mutual understanding and coopera-
tion among the governments and peoples of the
Asia Pacific region including the United States.
Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. govern-
ment with additional support provided by private
agencies, individuals, corporations, and Asian and
Pacific governments.
East-West Center Working Papers are circulated for
comment and to inform interested colleagues about
work in progress at the Center.









Website: www.EastWestCenter.orgEAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS
Economics Series Economics Series Economics Series Economics Series Economics Series
No. 88, February 2006
Christopher Edmonds is a Fellow at the East-West Center,
and Adjunct Graduate Faculty in the Department of
Economics at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.
Sumner J. La Croix is a Professor in the Department of
Economics at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and an
Adjunct Senior Fellow at the East-West Center.
Yao Li is a Doctoral Student in the Department of Econ-
omics at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and an East-
West Center Degree Fellow.
East-West Center Working Papers: Economics Series is an
unreviewed and unedited prepublication series reporting on
research in progress. The views expressed are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Center. Please direct
orders and requests to the East-West Center's Publication
Sales Office. The price for Working Papers is $3.00 each plus
shipping and handling.
China's Rise as an International
Trading Power
Christopher Edmonds, Sumner J. La Croix, and Yao LiChina’s Rise as an International Trading Power 
Christopher Edmonds 
Sumner J. La Croix 
Yao Li* 
Revised Draft:  February 28, 2006 
Abstract
This research reviews the policies that have shaped China’s manufactured export explosion, 
and examines long trend statistics on the evolution of China’s trading partners and the goods 
it trades in the post-reform period.  Common characteristics in China’s trade experience with 
those of earlier successful export-based economies of East Asia are detailed. The authors 
find that China’s pattern of trade and trading partners are similar to those of more market-
based Asian economies, but that the Chinese economy’s orientation toward foreign trade is 
much greater than expected for an economy of its size and level of development. The 
authors argue that China still has a long way to go in terms of its export boom, especially if 
compared to the experiences of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. This suggests that China is 
on track to become one of the world’s most formidable trading powers and its export 
policies and export performance will exert increasing influence on how the global trade 
regime evolves in the future. 
* We thank participants in the August 2004 and August 2005 East-West Center Conferences 
on China’s Capitalist Transition and the December 2005 Aoyama Gakuin University 
Workshop on Asia’s Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation for their helpful 
comments.  We also thank Calla Wiemer and Xiaojun Wang for their review and comments 
on the paper.  We acknowledge the substantial contribution of Matthew Pennaz to early 
stages of this research.  Lastly, we extend our gratitude to Scott Nojiri and Jane Ho for their 
research support. I.    Introduction 
  Since China initiated economic reforms in 1979, its economic growth has been 
exceptional (Table 1).  The average income of a Chinese citizen has risen from US$717 in 
1980 to US$4,726 in 2003.
1  Over the same 1980-2003 period, China’s exports and imports 
increased at an annual rate of 10.2 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively.  Export growth has 
regularly outpaced output growth, with the share of exports in China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) rising from 13.9 percent in 1985 to 19.3 percent in 1992 to 30.1 percent in 
2003.
2
China’s trade growth since 2001 has been particularly strong, with average annual 
growth rates of Chinese exports and imports increasing to 26 and 28 percent, respectively.   
The rapid growth in trade is due to the rise of markets for capital, labor, and consumer 
goods within China; to China’s domestic economic policies that have facilitated production 
of the labor-intensive goods in which it has a comparative advantage; and to continued 
rigidities in China’s domestic markets.  China’s rapid export growth has raised tensions with 
major trading partners, many of whom have initiated anti-dumping actions and imposed 
safeguard quotas on imports from China.  The specter of increased competition from 
Chinese firms and consumers for scarce oil and other natural resources has concerned 
foreign policymakers as they consider the implications of China’s spectacular trade growth 
for their economies and the global economy.  It is in this policy context that we analyze the 
trade policies adopted by China’s governments and the resulting trade flows that have 
transformed the Chinese economy and forced trading partners to reconsider their strategies 
for generating future economic growth.
Our chapter begins by reviewing how China’s trade and trade policies have evolved 
since the start of the country’s economic reforms.  The process of China’s accession to 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its implementation of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and trade liberalization measures promised in its accession protocol 
figures prominently in our story.  The second section examines how the composition of 
goods and service traded and the value of trade with particular countries and regions has 
changed.  We also consider the extent to which China’s export surge is similar to the earlier 
export surges by Asian economies—Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia—in the 1949-2003 period.  The paper concludes by 
assessing future prospects for China’s international trade. 
II.    A Brief Overview of China’s Policies Towards International Trade 
In the reform era (1978- ), China’s policies towards international trade have rapidly 
evolved, moving from the prohibition of trade in all but a few products to a relatively liberal 
stance towards both imports and exports.  China’s rapid trade liberalization has been 
1 The income figures have been adjusted to reflect international price difference, i.e., they are purchasing power 
parity estimates. 
2Our estimates do not incorporate recent revisions in China’s GDP that increase overall GDP levels.  The 
revisions also have the effect of reducing the share of traded goods in GDP by increasing the share of GDP 
from non-tradable services.  
1accompanied by a generally rapid liberalization of its stance towards FDI.  Analysis of trade 
flows is facilitated by considering policies towards both trade and FDI, as foreign firms can 
service the Chinese market either by exports or by producing their products within China.   
We note a shift in China’s trade liberalization after its admission to the WTO in 2001, with 
trade liberalization shifting from policy changes applying to all trading partners to policy 
changes applying to particular trading partners.  Finally, China’s sustained post-2000 
economic growth has induced the national government to devote considerable political 
effort to finding and securing raw materials and energy inputs vital to the continued growth 
of its manufacturing sector and overall economy.
China’s trade flows during the reform period were regulated by a network of bilateral 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) agreements until its WTO accession in December 2001.  The 
MFN agreements mandated that China provide its trading partners with the most favorable 
trade arrangements negotiated with other trading partners, and vice versa.  Europe (in 1978) 
and the United States (in 1980) both granted MFN status to China soon after it initiated 
economic reforms, gaining China immediate access to the world’s two largest export  
markets.
3  China’s import barriers were initially very high but have secularly declined over 
the last 25 years due to both negotiated and unilateral tariff reductions by the Chinese 
government; the decline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which tend to buy from other 
SOEs; and to improvements in China’s distribution networks.  China has also benefited 
from the global reduction in trade barriers stemming from the 1995 WTO Agreement.  
Clarete et al. (2004) used a gravity model to analyze China’s trade prior to WTO accession 
and concluded that China’s network of MFN agreements generally allowed its exports to 
gain access even to economies that were members of Preferential Trading Areas (PTAs) and 
that might have been expected to heavily discriminate against trade from non-members.   
The MFN treaty network was successful in jump-starting China’s trade but provided 
flawed institutional foundations for long-run trade relationships.  One problem was the 
uncertainty clouding China’s MFN status with the United States.  U.S. federal law, 
specifically the Jackson-Vanick amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, requires that the MFN 
status of communist countries be linked to a review of their immigration policies.  After the 
1989 Tiananmen Square incident, U.S. legislators used the annual vote on MFN renewal to 
make statements on human rights violations in China.  Since the votes in Congress were 
usually closely contested, future access to the U.S. market by China’s manufacturing firms 
was far from assured, which—among other things—limited investment in mainland Chinese 
manufacturing plants focused on the U.S. market. 
A second problem with reliance on the network of MFN relationships was that the 
value of an alternative institutional arrangement—membership in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—increased in value with the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization in 1995.  By incorporating a governance mechanism for resolving trade 
disputes, the value of the WTO-GATT multilateral rules increased to non-members, such as 
3 In the 1980s both the European Union and the United States had high tariffs and restrictive quotas on the 
import of a broad range of agricultural products.  Since China’s initial exports were heavily weighted towards 
agricultural products, these barriers were binding constraints.  China’s shift in the mid-1980s towards the 
export of labor-intensive goods lessened the impact of U.S. and E.U. tariff and non-tariff barriers on Chinese 
exports due to the lower protection afforded these products. 
2China, where exports constituted a large share of GDP.  The value of the WTO as an 
institutional foundation for trade also increased because of its incorporation of a wide array 
of rules governing intellectual property in traded goods, trade in services, and government 
procurement.  These rules were not usually included in MFN agreements, yet had the 
potential to fuel growth in China. 
To become a WTO member, China announced and implemented numerous policy 
reforms during the mid-to-late 1990s designed to provide the institutional foundations for 
well-functioning product, labor, and capital markets and adopted many of the economic 
institutions required by the WTO, e.g. minimum standards of intellectual property rights and 
required enforcement procedures; national treatment of foreign products and firms; and 
bound tariff rates.  A 1999 trade agreement with the United States provided the signal to 
firms in China and elsewhere that WTO membership for China was close.  After nearly 15 
years of negotiations that included signing bilateral agreements with 37 countries, China 
entered the WTO in December 2001.  As reflected in its accession protocol, China had made 
nearly 700 commitments to WTO members to reduce import barriers in specific product 
markets and to end discrimination against foreign-invested enterprises in most sectors.  Most 
of the commitments were front-loaded and were implemented by December 2004.  Other 
commitments including completion of promised tariff cuts, quota removals, and the end of 
geographic restrictions on some types of foreign investments are still in process.  The full 
package of commitments will not be fully implemented until 2010.
The American Chamber of Commerce-China, an organization that has incentives to 
identify problems with China’s compliance, concluded in December 2004 that China “is 
substantially in compliance with its WTO deadlines and specific obligations”.
4  Major 
exceptions are the enforcement of intellectual property rights; allowing entry of foreign-
invested telecom service providers and wholly-foreign-owned construction firms; and 
allowing various types of product distribution by foreign-invested firms.
China’s accession to the WTO was accomplished only after it agreed to special 
provisions allowing member countries to restrict Chinese exports during specified transition 
periods.  For example, paragraph 242 of the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding on 
China’s entry to the World Trade Organization and a similar provision in the European 
Union (EU) Agreement provide WTO members with the right to impose a 7.5 percent (6 
percent for woolens) “safeguard” quota on annual increases in imports of textiles and 
apparel from China through 2008 if Chinese imports were “due to market disruption, 
threatening to impede the orderly development of trade.”  Second, Article 16 of China’s 
Protocol of Accession to the WTO also allows WTO members to impose safeguard quotas 
when “imports of a product from China are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, 
so as to be a specific cause of material injury or threat of material injury to the domestic 
industry.”
5 The trigger to impose these “special” safeguards is less stringent than that 
specified for usual WTO safeguards, as it examines the effect of all imports rather than just 
those from one country.  This “special” safeguard provision does not expire until December 
4 American Chamber of Commerce-China (2005). 
5 The protocol is available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeteacc_e.htm. (last 
accessed on August 6, 2005). 
32013.  Third, China’s accession protocol specifies that China will be treated as a “non-market 
economy” in anti-dumping cases through December 2016.  This means that an analogue 
economy must be identified and their prices used to calculate production costs and 
countervailing duties.  Nielsen and Rutkowski (2005) and Chu and Prusa (2005) have 
concluded that this standard tends to bias results of anti-dumping cases strongly against 
China.  Both the tendency for rising numbers of anti-dumping actions and the “safeguards” 
agreed to by China in its WTO accession agreements suggest that China’s trading partners 
will have wide purview to pursue protectionist measures against Chinese imports during the 
next several years.  The combination of the textile-apparel safeguard (through 2008), the 
product-specific “special” safeguard (through December 2013), and the non-market 
assumption in anti-dumping cases (through December 2016) provide WTO members with 
unilateral tools to raise the domestic prices of their imports from Chinese and thereby limit 
the growth of Chinese imports.  While WTO membership has helped to secure access to the 
Chinese market by foreign firms—either via direct foreign investment or exports—and to 
secure access to foreign markets by Chinese firms, it has also put in place a medium-term 
minefield of legal measures that foreign firms can use to restrict the flow of Chinese imports 
to their markets.
We mention China’s rapid liberalization of FDI flows in passing, because it has 
influenced the size and composition of China’s trade flows (Zhang and Soong 2000).  The 
activities of foreign firms in China were initially restricted to a limited number of sectors; 
required to export the bulk of their production; and in many instances required to have a 
Chinese partner with 50 percent or more ownership.  Relaxation of these requirements for 
most industries has led to massive FDI flows from Asia, Europe, and North America.  The 
accumulation of a large stock of FDI in China has altered China’s trade flows, as many 
foreign firms import intermediate goods, assemble them in China, and export final products 
to foreign markets.  This is important, as foreign firms have come to play a large role in 
China’s international trade, and the share of exports being produced in foreign–invested 
firms represents an increasing share of enterprises in China (Zhang and Soong 2000). 
Prior to its 2001 WTO accession, China was not party to any PTAs except its many 
bilateral MFN agreements, as its political leadership may have been consumed with the 
massive negotiating efforts required to gain WTO entry and likely wished to avoid the 
perception of going against the principal of non-preferential trade arrangements that 
underpins the WTO.  Since WTO accession, China has quickly embraced the formation of 
PTAs as a mechanism for securing trade liberalization and furthering the access of Chinese 
firms to important foreign markets.  China’s vigorous negotiation of PTAs has ushered in a 
wave of new PTAs in Asia following years of lackadaisical progress.  As of July 2005, China 
was negotiating or had proposed PTAs with Australia, Chile, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and four regional grouping— the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mercosur, and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
6  In November 2002, China and ASEAN 
announced an agreement to implement a PTA with the original 6 ASEAN member countries 
by 2010 and with less developed ASEAN members by 2015.
7  As part of the PTA 
6 The Mercosur PTA includes Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay.  The SCO—founded in 2001—is 
composed of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
7 See Tongzon (2005) for an optimistic assessment of potential gains from the ASEAN-China PTA. 
4implementation process, China and ASEAN embarked on the “Early Harvest” program, in 
which China and ASEAN reduced tariffs on specified agricultural products from 1 January 
2004 and have agreed to eliminate them by 1 January 2006.  Preliminary reports signal “Early 
Harvest” to be a success, with trade in agricultural products increasing in both directions.
Another tangible step in the implementation of the China-ASEAN PTA occurred on 20 July 
2005 when low preferential tariff rates were instituted on over 7,000 industrial goods traded 
by member countries.
Antkiewicz and  Whalley (2004) emphasize that China’s PTA agreements have 
focused on preferential reductions in tariff rates and elimination of non-tariff barriers, unlike 
U.S.-initiated PTA agreements that tend to address a broader scope of issues, including 
investment and intellectual property rights.  Frustration with the slow progress in the Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations may be one reason that China—a large country—has pursued 
PTAs despite research showing that most gains accrue to the smaller partner (Lee et. al. 
2004).  China’s PTA drive may also reflect its strategic interest in promoting economic 
integration with its neighbors, fostering economic growth and stability in its ‘backyard’, and 
increasing its political and economic influence in neighboring Northeast and Southeast Asian 
countries.  McLaren (1996) and La Croix and Grandy (1997) have cautioned that PTAs 
which asymmetrically benefit small economies can in some circumstances make the small 
country dependent on the large country’s willingness to continue the PTA agreement.  
Finally, PTA negotiations should also be viewed as a critical component of the Chinese 
government’s drive to raise its leadership role internationally.
China’s push to conclude PTAs with Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Mercosur, and the SCO may be tied to its ongoing effort to secure 
long-term supplies of critical natural resources—oil, minerals, intermediate agricultural 
inputs—for its rapidly growing manufacturing and transportation industries.  State-owned 
trading and resource enterprises have entered into long-term contracts with resource 
suppliers around the globe, thereby replicating similar contracts entered into by the 
developed countries.  The contracts’ prices are typically tied to world market prices and 
entail significant risks for the Chinese companies entering into these contracts. 
III.  Trends in China’s International Trade 
This section identifies the major stylized facts and trends of China’s international 
trade and discusses the implications of those trends for China and its trading partners.
Between 1978 and 2004, the value of exports as a share of total GDP in China underwent a 
huge increase (see Table 1).  In 1978 China’s exports comprised only 4.2 percent of GDP 
while in 2004 they comprised 35.9 percent.  Over the past 20 years, average annual growth 
rates in the real value of exports have been high—though widely fluctuating--ranging from 
5.6 to 32 percent.  The value of imports also increased rapidly, nearly keeping pace with 
increases in the value of exports.  Because export growth slightly outpaced import growth, 
China’s modest trade deficits turned into modest trade surpluses, and in 2004 to a large trade 
surplus.  Both import and export growth rates have increased since 2000, with annual 
growth rates exceeding 20 percent for both series.
5Since the late 1970s, China has undergone a fundamental shift in its trade partners.  
Early in the period, China’s foreign trade was primarily oriented toward other Eastern Bloc 
countries, and displayed a pattern typical of these economies.  Over the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s, China’s trade refocused dramatically towards large market economies, Asian 
economies, and countries with large endowments of natural resources.  China’s exports to 
both Europe and North America expanded greatly between 1995 and 2003 (rising from a 
value of 54.1 to 180.1 billion constant year 2000 $US – more than a threefold increase), 
while its imports from non-OECD (Organizations of Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries grew even more rapidly.  In terms of the individual countries that 
have been China’s largest trading partners, the most striking changes over the past 30 years 
include: 1) the rise of the United States as a leading market for Chinese exports, 2) the 
secular decline of Japan as a market for Chinese exports and its continued leading role as a 
source of imports, 3) the remarkable rise of Korean exports to China since the two countries 
opened trade in 1989, and 4) the continuing low shares of large EU economies in both 
Chinese imports and exports, e.g. only Germany makes the top ten list of suppliers of 
imports to China.  China’s international trade patterns have changed sufficiently that they 
have come (since the late 1990s) to resemble those of other export-oriented manufacturing 
economies of Asia:  Trade surpluses from the sale of manufactures to OECD countries are 
used to finance trade deficits for the purchase of resources and intermediate inputs from 
non-OECD countries.
Are China’s exports to and imports from different countries consistent with 
predictions of economic theory and historical data on international trade of countries of a 
similar size and level of development?  To answer these questions, trade volumes must be 
adjusted for a host of characteristics of the trading countries, e.g. size of the economies 
involved, distances between countries, and linguistic and cultural affinity.  We utilize export 
and import intensity indexes derived from “gravity models” that adjust the expected level of 
trade for these characteristics to gain insight into this issue.
8  The main findings from the 
gravity model analysis include:  China’s level of exports and imports are significantly above 
what one would expect given its size and level of development; China’s tendency to trade at 
higher than predicted levels has generally increased over time; and there were marked 
differences in the strength of China’s actual trade relationships vis-à-vis expected trade links 
across individual countries (and aggregating these, across global regions).  China’s export and 
import intensities were highest, i.e., China’s level of trade was higher than expected, with 
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, and lowest with Asia.   
Figure 1 compares the observed level of China’s exports against the level of exports 
expected from gravity model estimates that account for the effect of economy size, distance, 
and similar variables in determining the level of exports between countries.  Points on the 
diagonal line reflect cases in which the expected and observed exports were equal; points 
above (below) the line are ones in which observed exports exceed (fall below) expected 
exports.  The gravity model’s predicted trade flows can be understood as representing the 
level of exports one would expect if China’s trade reflected global averages of modeled 
characteristics on trade flows.  Figure 2 makes the same comparison for China’s imports.  
Both figures show that for the vast majority of countries, observed exports from and 
8 See paper’s Appendix for an extensive discussion of the methodology underlying the gravity model. 
6observed imports to China exceed predicted levels.  The share of countries for which 
observed exports exceed predicted exports has increased over the course of the reform 
period.  In 1985, this was the case for 50 percent of the countries to which China exported 
goods, while by 2002 it had reached nearly 90 percent.  Calculations of gravity-model import 
intensities for China also suggest observed imports exceeded predicted imports from most 
countries.  The proportion of countries for which Chinese imports exceeded predictions of 
the gravity model was, however, lower than that found for Chinese exports.  This share has 
been increasing over time, rising from just under 35 percent in 1985 to 57.5 percent in 2002. 
  Two major findings emerge from this analysis:  Changes over time in China’s trade 
intensity elasticities are consistent with China’s departure from a centrally planned economy 
oriented toward trade with other communist bloc economies in the late 1980s to a more 
market-based economy displaying patterns of trade that broadly resemble those of its trading 
partners; and its estimated adjusted export intensity elasticities clearly reveal China’s 
excessive orientation toward foreign trade given its size and economic characteristics.  We 
discuss below factors that may be responsible for the latter trend.   
The changing product composition of China’s trade
GDP growth induces changes in factor endowments, the licensing and development 
of new technologies, and ultimately, induces changes in the composition and size of a 
country’s trade flows.  Given China’s dramatic economic expansion, we consider whether its 
exports and imports have become more diversified; more capital-intensive; and more 
technology intensive as its economy and trade have grown. 
Detailed data on the products comprising China’s imports and exports are publicly 
available for most countries at relatively high levels of aggregation that employ broad 
categories of goods that combine products that are not close substitutes.  Much more 
detailed data are, however, available for U.S.-China trade.  We use detailed (10-digit HS) time 
series data collected by the U.S. government covering over 17,000 product and commodities 
categories for the 1992-2004 period to track changes in the content of China’s trade.
9  Table 
2 shows that the increase in the value of U.S. imports from and exports to China over the 
1992-2004 period was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of products 
traded.  The number of products imported by the United States from China increased from 
6,602 in 1992 to 11,995 in 2004, while the number of products exported by the United States 
to China increased from 3,447 to 6,551.  When we compare the increases in the number of 
goods traded with China to increases in the number of goods traded with all countries, the 
magnitude of the increase in the breadth of U.S.-China trade becomes even more apparent.
The number of export goods increased from 8,036 in 1992 to 8,856 in 2004 and the number 
of import goods increased from 14,762 in 1992 to 16,824 in 2004. 
We calculate Herfindahl indexes to determine whether the increase in the number of 
products traded between the United States and China has resulted in trade becoming more 
or less concentrated on specific product categories.  The Herfindahl Index for U.S. imports 
from China increased only slightly between 1992 and 2004, indicating that Chinese imports 
9 HS is the Harmonized System of product classification for exports. 
7have become a little less diversified across (more specialized to) particular product 
categories--with the decline in diversification occurring after 1998 (the Herfindahl index 
actually rose slightly between 1992 and 1998).  On the other hand, the Herfindahl Index for 
U.S. exports declined substantially between 1992 and 2004, indicating that U.S. exports to 
China have become much more diversified across particular product categories.   We also 
note that China’s exports to the U.S. display a much greater diversity across product 
categories than U.S. exports to China, as indicated by the relative magnitudes of the 
Herfindahl Index reported on Table 2. 
Figures 3 and 4 characterize the changing composition of China’s exports to and 
imports from the rest of the world over the years 1985 to 2002.  The tables detail the value 
and share of China’s total exports/imports divided across six broad categories: 1) primary 
commodities, 2) labor-intensive and resource-based manufactures, 3) manufactures with low 
skill and technology intensity, 4) manufactures with medium skill and technology, 5) 
manufactures with high skill and technology, and 6) unclassified products.  Although this 
involves very large product categories, it reveals much about the relative growth of the 
principal sectors of the Chinese economy involved in trade.
10  The main trends in terms of 
the evolution of China’s exports across these broad categories of goods are: 1) declines in 
the shares—but not real value—of primary commodity and labor-intensive/resource-based 
manufactured exports, 2) the modest proportion and rise (1985 to 1995) and subsequent fall 
of the share of exports accounted for by manufactured goods with low skill and technology 
inputs, and 3) the large and sustained rises in the share and value of China’s manufactured 
exports based on production processes relying on high skill and technology inputs.  These 
results strongly suggest that China’s exports are becoming more skill intensive and that 
China’s comparative advantage is gradually shifting in this direction. 
Changes in the value and share of goods imported by China over time also display a 
number of noteworthy—although less clear—trends, which also underline the apparent 
technological advancement of manufactures production in China.  The value of all broad 
categories of imports increased each year between 1985 and 2002 (except 1998 due to the 
Asian Financial Crisis).  Average annual import growth over the 1985-2002 period was 
highest for labor-intensive and resource-based manufactures, and lowest for manufactures 
with low levels of embodied skills and technology, which fell from a 17.8 percent share of 
total imports in 1985 to a 5.8 percent share in 2002. 
Has the surge in Chinese imports and exports provided China’s firms with market 
power in selected markets?  Market power, i.e., the ability of a producer to influence market 
price by changing its production, requires a single producer (or coalition of producers) to 
produce a large share of market supply; varies inversely with the price elasticity of demand 
for the product; and decreases the easier it is for new firms to enter the market.  Market 
power is typically considered with reference to the market share of an individual firm or 
enterprise, but to the extent that China remains a non-market economy and central 
government planners still direct and coordinate the efforts of China’s enterprises, concern 
about potential monopoly power by a coalition of Chinese firms in a single industry is 
10 This categorization follows one used by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  See UNCTAD (2002), pp. 87-92, for details on how goods were categorized.
8relevant.  When we examine products aggregated into 900 categories, we find that the 2002 
market share of Chinese firms was substantial in silk, apparel and clothing, and coking coal.
The generally high elasticity of demand for these products and the relative ease of entry of 
new firms into these industries suggest that neither individual Chinese firms nor coalitions of 
firms are likely to be able to exercise market power.
China’s increased demand for primary commodities is also leading to concerns about 
increased global competition for scarce commodities—particularly non-renewable natural 
resources—and emerging Chinese monopsony power in these markets.  While increased 
Chinese demands may serve to bid up global prices in markets with inelastic supplies, the 
small Chinese share of these markets makes it unlikely that monopsony power could be 
exercised.  In the case of petroleum markets—the focus of much media and policymaker 
attention–China’s share of global crude and refined petroleum imports represented only 6 
percent of global oil trade in 2002, far too small a share to enable China to exercise 
monopsony power.  Even a doubling of this market share—as may occur over the next two 
decades—is unlikely to provide China with substantial monopsony power in the petroleum 
market.
  China’s global market shares of particular imported or exported products should 
increase as the level of specificity used in defining particular goods increases and as one 
considers single economies rather than the global economy.  Using the detailed data available 
on U.S.-China exports and imports—which define trade across more than 17 thousand types 
of goods—to assess China’s market shares, we find that the number of goods and 
commodities for which China supplied more than half of total U.S. imports nearly doubled 
during the years considered; rising from 620 goods (9.4 percent of all goods traded between 
the countries) in 1992, to 1,157 goods (12.5 percent) in 1998, and to 1,410 goods (17.8 
percent) in 2004.  The corresponding figures for goods that China supplied 90 percent or 
more of total U.S. imports were:  111 goods (1.7 percent) in 1992, to 253 goods (2.7 percent) 
in 1998, and to 481 goods (4 percent) in 2004.  The goods for which China supplies a 
majority or greater share of total U.S. imports include specialized agricultural products, 
chemicals, and very specific types of textiles and other light manufactures.  The number of 
U.S. exports that constitute a significant share of Chinese imports is smaller but has also 
been increasing.  In 1992, there were 22 such goods (0.6 percent of number of U.S. exports 
to China) for which U.S. share in total Chinese imports exceeded 50 percent.  By 2004, this 
figure had risen to 77 goods and a 1.2 share.
China’s trade growth and the transformation of its domestic economy 
  The growth of China’s international trade during the reform period has been fueled 
by structural and institutional changes and rigidities, and has also generated changes in 
China’s economy.  One factor behind China’s high trade growth is the web of constraints on 
trade between China’s provinces and provincial level municipalities.  These constraints stem 
from each province’s preferences for goods produced by provincial SOEs which, in turn, are 
legacies of older accounting and performance monitoring systems established when the 
economy operated under central and provincial plans.  These systems have declined in 
importance and evolved, but localities continue to face incentives for preferences toward 
local producers in their procurement and development planning.  Limited transport 
infrastructure between provinces has often meant that it was less costly for Chinese firms to 
9deliver goods to major seaports (and then to overseas markets) than to deliver them to 
internal markets.  Lastly, the growth of foreign-invested firms—which naturally tend to have 
stronger links to markets outside China and technologies to produce products demanded by 
consumers in high-income countries—has resulted in increased export orientation.
11
  Table 3 details how the expansion of China’s exports has altered the composition of 
enterprises (divided across SOEs, foreign-invested firms, and private domestic firms) in 
recent years.  The table also highlights the rise in the importance of production processes 
that are integrated with multinational production systems in China.  Because the value-added 
from final exports of internationally integrated firms is usually a minority share of the 
product’s price, the reported value of China’s exports overstates Chinese contributions to 
the production process and tends to over-emphasize the role of China in the international 
production chain (Naughton 1996). 
China’s expansion in trade has coincided with a period of profound social and 
economic change in China.  Space constraints allow us only to highlight a small number of 
key trends and developments related to the implications of China’s trade expansion for its 
domestic economy.  Some of the weightiest outcomes of China’s expanded trade have been 
the country’s rising wealth, increasing incomes, and falling poverty.  Since the beginning of 
China’s export boom, per capita GDP in China has risen at an average annual rate of 8.1 
percent.  This rise in average incomes in China has translated into remarkable falls in poverty 
incidence.  Using the official national income poverty line of the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics, the number of poor in rural China fell from 250 million in 1978 to just over 29 
million in 2001, which corresponds to a change in the rural poverty incidence from 33.1 to 
3.2 percent over the period.
12  Nearly half of this decline in poverty was achieved during the 
few years that followed the initial economic reforms in China.  By 1984, the poverty 
incidence had already fallen to 15.1 percent.  If one considers the World Bank US$1 PPP per 
day standard generally used for international comparisons of poverty incidence—which is 
available for a shorter period—poverty fell from 28.5 percent in 1987 to 16.6 percent in 
2001 (World Bank 2005).  The rising welfare and standard of living of many of China’s least 
economically fortunate citizens is also underlined by indicators such as the share of 
underweight children in the population: Between 1990 and 1998 the share fell from 22 to 
12.6 percent.
13
However, the level of inequality in China has risen sharply along with average 
incomes.  Disparities in wages and income levels of Chinese households have increased and 
disparities in the standard of living and development between coastal areas—where most 
exporting firms are located—and inland provinces have risen sharply.
14  Average incomes 
11 See Bajona and Chu (2005) for discussion of SOE regulation and impact of China’s WTO accession on such 
regulation. 
12 China Statistics Press (various years).  Urban poverty is less clearly defined and has been measured for a 
much shorter period than rural poverty.  Estimates reveal urban poverty incidence to be much lower than in 
rural areas.   
13 Fen and Chan-Kang. (2005), p. 10. 
14 The role of trade opening in altering rural-urban economic disparities in China is assessed in Anderson et al. 
(2003), and Huang and Rozelle (2003). 
10are lower and poverty incidences are higher in rural areas, particularly in inland provinces. 
According to estimates reported in the World Bank’s World Development Report (2001), in 1996 
about 70 percent of China’s rural poor lived in western provinces.
15  Inequality within rural 
and urban areas has also increased sharply since 1980.
16 Inequality in urban areas has 
increased steadily since 1981, while inequality in rural areas fell from 1981-1985 (-1.12 
percent average annual change) and 1995-1998 (-0.81 percent), but rose during 1986-1994 
(2.81 percent) and 1999-2001 (2.71 percent).
The concentration of export- and import-oriented businesses in a few higher-income 
coastal provinces is striking.
17  Guangdong alone accounted for over 35 percent of China’s 
exports and 33 percent of China’s imports in 2003.
18  The next largest trading provinces 
were Jiangsu (14.25 percent), Shanghai (13 percent), Zhejiang (nearly 8 percent), and 
Shangdong (nearly 6 percent).  These 5 provinces together accounted for 75.6 percent of the 
value of China’s exports in 2003.  Expressing the value of exported and imported goods 
across provinces in per capita terms makes the geographic concentration of trading activities 
in a few coastal provinces even clearer.  The value of exports per resident of Shanghai, 
Guangdong, and Tianjin was equivalent to US$2,854, US$1,979, and US$1,391, respectively.
This compares to per capita values of exports of only US$21 and US$29 in Guizhou and 
Gansu provinces—two of the least trade-oriented provinces.
19  Foreign direct investment 
and production by foreign-invested firms are also concentrated in these leading coastal 
provinces.  During the short period (1999-2003) for which the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics has reported FDI and value of provincial output by enterprise type (i.e., SOE, 
foreign-invested and other—principally privately-funded domestic firms), the share of 
exports from foreign-funded firms has increased sharply.   
  Other important domestic implications of China’s trade opening and trade growth 
that can only be mentioned in passing include repercussions on wage rates, rising 
government revenues and resources for infrastructure investment, the stability of China’s 
banks, and the growth in the “floating” population of internal migrants in China’s cities.
Both the persistence of provincial trade restrictions and preferences and state subsidies to 
and regulation of SOEs, and gaps in the institutional and physical infrastructures that 
connect China coastal cities and ports abroad and those that connect China internal markets, 
prompt successful foreign-invested and privately owned domestic firms to seek 
opportunities abroad in preference to domestic markets.  We note only that these 
developments can be traced—at least in part—to the country’s trade growth and represent 
opportunities and challenges to Chinese policymakers charged with channeling the process 
of globalization in China to productive and sustainable outcomes. 
15 See Ravallion and Chen (2004) for a more detailed review of poverty trends in China since 1980. 
16 Ravallion and Chen (2004), tables 10, 11, and 15. 
17 The role of China’s trade policies on firm location is discussed in Batisse and Poncet (2004) and Jin (2004). 
18 Provincial rankings in terms of value of exports and value of imports are generally the same. 
19 A comparison of the value of exports from each province as a share of the total value of final goods and 
services produced in the province yields similar results.   
11Export growth:  China v. other export-oriented Asian economies 
  We conclude our analysis of available data pertaining to China’s rising trade by 
comparing China’s experience with that of earlier export-oriented Asian economies that 
experienced export booms.  Figure 5 displays export growth for China and selected Asian 
countries, with the initial year normalized as the year in which rapid export growth began in 
each country.  Only South Korea’s export boom has occurred at a higher growth rate (in 
percentage terms) than China’s.  However, other Asian countries that have experienced 
export booms loom close behind China.  Figure 5 suggests that if China’s export boom plays 
out along the lines of export booms in comparison countries, then high export growth rates 
will likely continue for at least another decade.
  Comparison of China’s experience with the experiences of other Asian economies 
reveals a number of other interesting findings. First, the rapid growth in the value of China’s 
imports—which follow a similar trend to its exports—contrasts markedly with Japan’s 
experience.  A significant share of the growth in Chinese imports since 2000 is attributable 
to rising import of intermediate inputs to which Chinese firms added significant labor 
services and then export as final products. China’s high propensity to import—particularly 
notable for a large, poor country—is a critical part of China’s drive to modernize state-
owned enterprises, as import competition typically raises the productivity of domestic firms 
(Weinstein and Lawrence, 2001).  Second, China’s overall trade accounts have generally 
registered surpluses or deficits of less than 2 percent of GDP, although trade surpluses in 
excess of 4 percent of GDP have accumulated since 2003.  China’s trade deficits and 
surpluses with particular trading partners have sometimes been substantial, e.g. the large 
surpluses with the United States since 1997 and the large deficits with Korea and several 
ASEAN countries since 2001.
20  Some of the reasons for its large trading imbalances with 
individual countries include fixed exchange rates which preclude macroeconomic adjustment 
for imbalances at the individual country level; imbalance between savings and investment in 
the economies of some key trading partners; China’s subsidies and business loans to state-
owned enterprises; product mixes in country-pairs that are suitable for one country’s 
demands but not for the second country’s demands (e.g., US manufactures oriented toward 
relatively high-income US consumers may be unaffordable to most mainland Chinese); 
barriers to trade both within China and in foreign countries; the relationship between foreign 
investment and trade (discussed above); China’s lack of enforcement of copyrights in export 
goods such as computer software and films;
21 and the desire of China’s central bank to 
accumulate additional reserves to insulate the yuan from temporary political and economic 
shocks as well as speculative attacks. 
  In general, we expect the ratio of exports to GDP to have a negative correlation with 
the overall level of GDP, as larger countries are more diverse—stimulating greater internal 
20 China’s trade accounts with individual countries have been difficult to measure and interpret due to the 
entrepôt role played by Hong Kong and the unique treatment of a major trading partner, Taiwan, in its data 
(Fung and Lau 2003). 
21 The International Intellectual Property Alliance, a coalition of seven U.S. industry trade associations, 
estimates that the estimated U.S. trade losses due to China’s piracy of copyrighted U.S. products in 2004 
amounted to US$2.5 billion.  While this is a huge figure for the industries involved, it represented just 1-2 
percent of the U.S. trade deficit with China in 2004.  See http://www.iipa.com. 
12trade—and have sufficiently large markets to absorb the output of large manufacturing 
industries.  Taking this into account, China’s ratio of exports to GDP seems high, more in 
line with those of its smaller neighbors.  It stands in sharp contrast to Japan, once again 
highlighting the distinctiveness of the export booms and growth experiences of these two 
large Asian economies.  China’s much higher ratio suggests the stronger outward orientation 
of China’s economy and likely reflects the much lower level of internal economic integration 
in China (Young 1998).  One important implication of the much higher level of exports 
from China vis-à-vis Japan is that the Chinese economy would be expected to be more 
vulnerable to global economic downturns than Japan’s economy. 
V.   Prospects and Challenges 
  Our analysis has detailed changes in the volume, pattern (across countries and 
regions), and types of goods traded by China since the mid-1980s.  China’s pattern of trade 
has changed dramatically to reflect its increasing market orientation and its evolving 
comparative advantage.  China’s trading partners and mix of goods traded now resemble 
those of most industrialized export-oriented economies in Asia.  This represents a sharp 
transition from its earlier eastern bloc-oriented trading pattern and reliance on two entrepôts—
Hong Kong and Singapore—for transport and marketing services for its exports.  
Examination of the strength of China’s trade ties with its trading partners generally suggests 
that China’s trade follows a pattern typical of its more market-oriented neighbors, and 
reveals the country’s stronger ties to other economies in the East and Southeast Asia region 
are consistent with the economy’s size and its level of development, and the relatively close 
proximity of regional trading partners. 
  Results from our examination of historical data on provincial location, firm type, and 
mode of production of enterprises in China highlight the consequences of rising trade for 
the structure of China’s domestic economy. China’s rapid trade growth has enabled rising 
average income and reduced poverty incidence, but has also been associated with sharp 
increases in regional and local inequality.  The high growth in trade has led to a significant 
decline in the relative importance of SOEs versus private firms in the economy as a result of 
the higher growth in private firms.  Although the problem of government reform of 
unprofitable SOEs remains a serious challenge, the high rate of trade growth has greatly 
eased this challenge and allowed a much more gradual process than those that were carried 
out in other former communist/centrally planned economies.
Comparison of China’s export boom with those in other export-oriented Asian 
economies suggests that China’s export growth rate has been higher than those in the other 
Asian export boom countries (except South Korea).  The high growth rates have combined 
with the large size of China’s economy to generate an export expansion of unprecedented 
scale.  The export growth experiences of earlier boom economies suggest China’s high rate 
of export growth is likely to continue for at least another decade, unless impeded by overseas 
market restrictions.  The implications of China’s growth for the global economy are much 
greater than those of earlier Asia export boom economies in part because China’s population 
in 2005 represents 15 times as many people (1.3 billion) as Japan circa 1953 (87 million).
Earlier Asian export booms persisted for 20-30 years.  If China’s export boom (measured 
from 1984), were to last as long as Japan’s export boom (33 years), then China’s high rate of 
GDP growth registered in recent decades would likely continue for at least 12 more years.
13Were China’s GDP to increase by levels comparable to those achieved in Korea or Malaysia 
during the period of their export booms, the increase in the size of the Chinese economy 
would be astounding.  According to some forecasts, China’s GDP will reach US$5.59 trillion 
(in year 2003 US$) and be equivalent to 36.2 percent of U.S. projected GDP by 2017—
nearly triple the current percentage of 12.4 percent, if recent growth trends continue.
22
Growth of exports from China at such levels would likely induce a protectionist 
backlash.  An illustration of incipient protectionism against China’s exports may already be 
available in the case of textile trade, where recent trade restrictions imposed on Chinese 
textile exports after the 1 January 2005 expiration of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement quotas 
illustrate the scale of China’s export growth and its impact on textile prices globally, and may 
foreshadow further protectionist measures against the country.  The WTO has predicted that 
China's share of the world market in textiles and apparel will jump to 50 percent in 2007, 
from 17 percent in 2003, and that China will supply 65-90 percent of the world market by 
2010.  China reported that its textile exports to E.U. countries grew 82 percent in the first 
four months of 2005 over the prior year,and the U.S. Office of Textiles and Apparel 
reported that Chinese apparel exports to the United States grew 66 percent in the April-May 
2005 period compared to a year earlier.
23
Responses to the increase in China’s textile exports have been quick and unforgiving. 
The United States executed its right to impose a 7.5 percent “safeguard” quota on annual 
increases in imports of textiles and apparel from China.  Negotiations to increase that quota 
failed until November of 2005, when an agreement was reached in which textile shipments 
were expected to increase a total of 3.16 percent above what would have been allowed under 
the previously imposed annual cap.  In June 2005, China signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the EU in which China agreed to limit its annual growth rate of textile 
and clothing exports to the EU to between 8 and 12.5 percent.  The agreement with the 
United States expires in 2008 and with the EU in 2007.  After 2008, the EU has agreed to 
“exercise restraint” regarding trade restrictions against all categories of Chinese textiles while 
the U.S. has made no such promise.  A review of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO 
suggests that China’s chief trading partners in the West have broad authority to impose 
‘safeguard’ measures in response to rapid rises in their imports from China.  Considered 
along side the trend toward increasing use anti-dumping actions, this suggests that China’s 
WTO membership will offer it little recourse should countries initiate more restrictions on 
imports from China. 
However, there are some grounds for optimism concerning growth prospects for 
China’s trade.  WTO-induced reductions in average tariff rates have catalyzed China’s 
accelerated export growth in the few years since accession, and the WTO offers some 
protection (e.g., dispute adjudication) against future discriminatory trade restrictions against 
China.  WTO accession led to increased trade opening in China, where average import tariffs 
have fallen from 43.2 percent in 1992 to 9.9 percent in 2004.  Reduced tariffs have lowered 
the cost of imported intermediated inputs and enhanced economic prospects of fast growing 
processing and assembly enterprises, helping China to integrate into global production 
22 See Wilson and Purushothaman (2003). 
23 For example, see Buckley (2005).  
14chains and increase employment for workers moving from agriculture.  The country’s 
accession to WTO member status also underlined the stability of China’s economic reforms, 
helping to reinforce the stability of institutional arrangements in the country and spurring 
greater FDI into China.  Since 2002, China has emerged as a leading advocate of freer global 
trade—particularly in liberalization of existing tariffs and trade restrictions on agricultural 
goods.  In terms of bilateral negotiations, China has agreed to implement a PTA with 
ASEAN by 2010, and has initiated PTA negotiations with 25 countries.  
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0PLEASE NOTE: The versions of Figures 1 and 2 that appear in the working paper that is available for 
downloading from the internet are presented in low resolution and lose much of the detail (due to file size 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5              Table 3. Composition of China's Trade Across Mode of Production 
and Enterprise Ownership
                     Value (nom.$US billions)      
2001 2004 2001 2004
EXPORTS 266.15      593.37      100.0    100.0
      by mode of production
Conventional Trade 111.92      243.64      42.1      41.1
Processing Trade 147.45      327.99      55.4      55.3
Processing trade with supplied material    -- 68.57   -- 11.6
Processing trade with imported material    -- 259.42   -- 43.7
Other Mode 6.78          21.74        2.5        3.7       
      by type of enterprise
State-owned Enterprises 113.23      153.59      42.5      25.9
Foreign-funded Enterprises 133.24      338.61      50.1      57.1
Other Enterprises 19.69        101.17      7.4        17.1
       Shares         
       Collective Enterprises   -- 31.79   -- 5.4       
       Private Enterprises   -- 69.25   -- 11.7
IMPORTS 243.61      561.42      100.0    100.0
      by mode of production
Conventional Trade 113.47      248.23      46.6      44.2
Processing Trade 93.98        221.74 38.6      39.5
Processing trade with supplied material    -- 53.72   -- 9.6       
Processing trade with imported material    -- 168.02   -- 29.9
Other Mode 36.16        91.45        14.8      16.3
      by type of enterprise
State-owned Enterprises 1,035.50    1,764.50 42.5      31.4
Foreign-funded Enterprises 1,258.60    3,245.70 51.7      57.8
Other Enterprises 142.00      604.00 5.8        10.8
       Collective Enterprises   -- 177.20   -- 3.2       
       Private Enterprises   -- 419.80   -- 7.5       











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7   Table 4. Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Exports in Different Periods
















China 1979-2003 25 18.428 1999-2003 5 18.614
Hong Kong 1962-1995 34 11.131 1999-2003 5 10.119
Indonesia 1970-1974 5 33.584 1999-2003 5 -3.550
1976-1980 5 13.662
1986-1996 11 16.681
Japan 1949-1974 26 14.521 1999-2003 5 4.306
1979-1984 6 10.349
Korea 1964-1987 24 21.374 1999-2003 5 5.597
1994-1996 3 11.181
Malaysia  1973-1980 8 14.955 1999-2003 5 5.469
1983-1996 14 11.936
Singapore 1969-1980 12 15.234 1999-2003 5 6.562
1987-1996 10 9.965
Taiwan  1976-1981 6 15.242 1999-2003 5 5.859
1983-1987 5 13.880
Thailand  1959-1967 9 9.223 1999-2003 5 9.323
1971-1981 11 14.166
1984-1996 13 14.224
Source: Authors' calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (2005) and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004 (http://www.adb.org/statistics) 
for Taiwan data.
28Appendix:  Gravity model estimates applied in the paper.
A number of indicators are commonly used to measure the strength of trade relationships 
between countries in empirical examinations of international trade.  These indicators gauge 
the level of trade against the size of economies, and other structural characteristics important 
in determining trade levels (e.g., distance between the countries).  The simplest measures are 





is the share of trade between country i and j to country i's share of total world trade; x
T
i,j is 
exports from country i to country j, and x
T
i,W  is total exports of country i to the world.   
Exports, imports, or trade volumes (exports plus imports) can be used in calculating this 
summary statistic.  The trade share highlights the importance of trade between two countries 
and is useful for comparing trade flows over time between two countries.  However, its 
usefulness is limited in cross country comparisons as economies of different size can be 
expected to trade in proportion to the overall size of their economies.
The trade concentration ratio or trade intensity index (Frankel 1997, Petri 1993) 
overcomes the economy-size problem encountered in cross-country comparisons of trade 
shares by gauging trade levels between countries i and j in relation to country’s i's average 









W,W), where notation is as above with the addition of x
T
W,W which is total 
global exports.  If the trade intensity index equals one, trade partners are trading with each 
other in the same intensity as they are trading with the world as a whole, whereas values 
above (below) one indicates trade between the countries is at a level above (below) their 
average levels of trade with the rest of the world. 
However, it is widely documented in empirical studies of trade that the distance 
between countries strongly influences their level of trade since distance tends to be highly 
correlated with transport costs.  Ng and Yeats (2003) use this insight to refine the trade 
intensity index so that it takes into account the distance between countries in calculating 
their trade intensity.  They propose a trade index that adjusts index values for the average 
estimated effect of distance on global trade patterns.  Specifically, the trade intensity index is 
adjusted according to the distance between the capitols of two trading countries.  The 
adjustment coefficient is derived from a standard gravity model coefficient capturing the 
average effect of distance on trade flows between pairs of countries worldwide as estimated 
using cross-sectional time series data on the value of exports or exports plus imports over 
time.  In the analysis offered in this paper, we extend this approach by adding adjustments 
related several country characteristics that are know to influence the level of trade between 
countries.  This approach follows a widely applied model used in empirical studies of 
international trade commonly referred to as ‘gravity model estimation.’
24  In this paper we 
estimate a full gravity model and adjust the standard trade intensity index by each of the 
statistically significant parameters from the model.  Accordingly, our ‘gravity model adjusted 
24 The gravity model and its theoretical underpinnings as applied to analyze international trade flows have been 
developed in a number of papers: Deardorf (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985); and Helpman (1987).  The 
name comes from an analogy between key factors explaining gravitation under Newton’s theory (mass and 
distance) and the analogous role economy size (GDP) and distance play in explaining trade flows under the 
gravity model of international trade.  Frankel (op. cit., p. 61) cites Helpman and Krugman as the originators of 
the standard gravity model.   
29trade intensity index’ adjusts for several factors found to systematically affect trade between 
countries.  Our specification of the gravity equation follows the specification in Clarete et al. 
(2003), and is as follows:  
ln(Tijt)=[E0+E1lnDi j+E2ln(Yi)t-1+E3ln(Yj)t-1+E4ln(Popi)t+E5ln(Popj)t+E10ln(Areai)+E11ln(Areaj)
+E15Smctryij]+[E8Landli+E9Landlj +E7Contij+E6Islandli+E6Islandlj@+[E6Langij+E13Colonyij
          +E12ComColij+E14Col45ij ]+Hijt
where i and j denotes trading partners (country i is the exporting country and j is the 
importing country), and t denotes time.  The left hand side variables divide into three groups 
denoted by the square brackets. For first group contain the base variables of the gravity 
model and capture notions of economy size and country size considered fundamental in 
driving trade flows under the gravity model.  All the models estimated include these 
variables, so it is also referred to as the base gravity model.  The second group of variables 
captures geographic characteristics, besides the distance between the trading countries that 
are expected to influence their level of trade.  The third group of variables captures shared 
historical and linguistic ties between countries that may be expected to strengthen trade 
relationships.
Notation of the variables in the model—and the expectation regarding the 
relationship between the level of trade and each variable—are as follows:
25
x Tijt denotes the value exports (or imports) of country i to country j at time t,
x Dij  is the linear distance between capital cities of the trading countries—distance is 
expected to have a negative association with trade level since it proxies transport and 
transaction costs,
x Y is real GDP of country i/j in year t-1 (in constant year 2000 dollars), the variables 
enters the model with a one year lag to address potential endogeneity between trade 
levels and GDP—larger economies are expected to trade more,
x Pop is the population of country i/j in year t—countries with larger populations are 
generally expected to trade less because of their larger domestic markets, 
x Area is the land area (in square kilometers) of country i/j—countries with large land 
areas are expected to trade less because greater land area is associated with larger 
internal markets and greater availability of resources domestically,
x Smctry is a binary variable which is unity if both country i and j had constant 
boundaries between 1985 and 2002 (with the break up of the Former Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and other countries, several new countries were formed after 1985 
resulting in interrupted time series data)—countries with steady borders are expected 
to have higher trade due to their greater stability and cultivation of trading 
relationships over time, 
25 The rationale for the inclusion of particular variables and expectations regarding their relationship to trade 
levels is widely discussed in the literature developing and applying the gravity model of trade, for example see 
discussions in Linneman (1966), Krugman (1991), and Frankel (op. cit.).  
30x Landl is a binary variable which is unity if country i/j is landlocked (no sea ports of 
direct sea access)—landlocked status is expected to be associated with lower trade 
due to higher trade costs, 
x Cont is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j border one another—
countries sharing a common land border are expected to trade more due to 
proximity and ease of overland transport , 
x Islandl is a binary variable which is unity if country i/j is a small island country—small 
island countries are expected to trade at a higher rate due to limited domestic market 
and natural resources, 
x Lang is a binary variable which equals 1 if i and j share a common language (zero 
otherwise)—shared language and historical ties through colonialism are expected to 
increase trade links between countries,  
x Colony is a binary variable which equals 1 if country i established a colony in country j
or vice versa,
x ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were colonies of the same colonial 
power,
x Col45 is a binary variable which is unity if i and j had a colonial relationship after 
1945, and
x Hij represents model error and the effect of other influences on bilateral trade that are 
omitted.
Estimation coefficients can be interpreted as measuring the elasticity of exports with respect 
to changes in the explanatory variables.   
Data on exports used in the estimates are drawn from World Trade Analyzer (WTA), a 
trade database provided by the International Trade Division of Statistics Canada. It contains 
adjusted United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNTAD) source data on 
over 180 countries’ international trade activities at four-digit level of Standard International 
Trade Classification (Rev 2) from 1985. An important feature of this data is that recorded 
imports and exports of trading countries are rectified so that exports reported by the 
exporting country are consistent with the imports reported by the importing country, which 
is not the case in the original UN-COMTRADE data upon which the WTA data is based.  
The model is estimated for pairs of countries that recorded positive trade, so omits cases 
where exports equal to zero were recorded.  Accordingly, the model explains the level of 
trade among trading countries rather than trade per se (i.e. the decision of whether to trade 
at all, and the level of trade).  This treatment of observed cases of zero trade also alleviates 
the issue of transforming zero cases into logarithms, which is typically handled by the 
addition of an arbitrary small constant to such cases before they are transformed into 
logarithms.
Data on the distance between trading countries and related geographic characteristics 
were obtained from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
database.
26 The database incorporates geographical variables for 225 countries, including 
information on distance between the capital and largest cities of each pair of countries, and 
26 Available online at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
31dummy variables indicating whether a country is landlocked, and whether pairs of countries 
are contiguous or share a common language or post-WWII colonizer.  Combining the 
CEPII data with detailed data on trade from the WTA yields a panel of 24,492 country pairs 
(across 157 countries) during the period 1985 to 2002.  Other sources of data from which 
variables used in our gravity model estimates are drawn include: the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI 2005), the Asian Development Bank’s Key Indicators (KI 
2005), and data available on Jon Haveman’s international trade data website.
27
Unfortunately, some economies that have had close trade relationships with China 
historically, such as Russia, North Korea, do not have GDP data in the WDI so had to be 
dropped from the analysis. However, most Asian countries and all OECD member 
economies are included.  Ultimately, missing data for selected countries and years resulted in 
the loss of some observations leaving an average of 24,649 country pairs with an average of 
18 years of data for the regression (Appendix Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of 
variables in our dataset and the source of each variable). Because the WTA cleans and 
corrects data to ensure concordance between exports reported from country A to country B 
and imports reported by country B from country A, regressions run on exports or imports 
will produce equivalent results.  We estimate our models for exports, which follows standard 
practice (trade volumes are also used as the dependent variable in some gravity model 
estimates).   
The gravity model is estimated using the random effects generalized least squares 
(GLS) panel estimator (sometimes referred to as the random error components panel 
estimator) on the full dataset, as well as using standard log-linear generalized least squares 
regression on cross-sections of selected individual years of our data.  The random effects 
estimator breaks up the standard regression residual into two components: one component 
captures the systematic error observed in estimated trade for each country-pair while the 
second component captures the regular residual.  Estimation coefficients reflect a weighted 
average of the cross-sectional and time-series association between the dependent and 
independent variables included, and the weighting is defined by the estimation parameter 
theta—which is reported for our estimates (technical details on the random effects estimator 
are available in Greene (2003)).  The panel estimator is usually a more efficient estimator 
since it makes use of the complete cross-sectional time series of observations country-pair 
exports while the cross-sectional estimation results offer somewhat easier interpretation and 
the evolution of results over time can yield useful insights into how trade has evolved and 
the factors driving trade flows have evolved over time. 
Appendix Table 2 summarizes results from our random effects generalized least 
squares panel regression estimates for the base gravity model and three extensions of this 
model.  Following the approach of Ng and Yeats (op. cit.), we also estimated a simpler 
regression predicting trade for country-pairs based only on the distance between them, 
which is applied to derive the distance adjustment used in the distance-adjusted trade 
27 Data of development indicators for Taiwan are from ADB (2005), while data for other countries were drawn 
from WDI 2005.  Haveman’s trade data available at 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/ Trade.Resources/TradeData.html
(last accessed on February 14, 2006) 
32intensity index but are not reported on Table 2 due to space constraints.
28  The parameters 
used in the ‘gravity adjusted trade intensity index’ figures reported and discussed in the paper 
were obtained from model 4 reported on the table, but we report the four variants of the 
model to highlight the robustness of the model to the inclusion of variables in addition to 
those included in the base model.  
The overall statistical significance of the estimation models is evaluated using a Wald 
Chi-square test, while the need for the random effects estimator as opposed to treating the 
cross-sectional time-series data simply as a cross-section and applying regular GLS is tested 
by applying a Breusch-Pagan Langranian Multiplier test (technical details also in Greene, op. 
cit.). In the cases of both these diagnostic statistics, the probability of a false rejection of the 
null hypotheses that the model has no explanatory power over the dependent variable and 
country-pair specific error terms included in the random effects estimator have a variance of 
zero (thus regular GLS estimator can be used) is reported on our tables. Results of both tests 
are reported at the bottom of Appendix Table 2 and highlight the statistical significance of 
the models and support application of the random effects GLS estimator.  “R-square” values 
reported for the model estimates indicate they perform well in explaining variation in the 
level of trade between countries—explaining 65 to 67 percent of the variation in observed 
bilateral trade flows.
29  The parameter rho shows the fraction of variance due to the error 
component associated with country-pairs over time, and equals .70 for all the models.  The 
greater explanatory power of variation in the level of bilateral trade between country-pairs 
over time is also implied by the estimated thetas, which range between 44 and 85 percent 
(across models and observations) and are the weights are given to the time-series component 
of the estimator.  The high values of the estimated rho and theta parameters recommend 
application of the random effects estimator as a more efficient estimator.   
The statistical significance of estimation parameters is tested using a test that is 
functionally equivalent to a standard t-test applied in OLS and GLS regressions. Estimation 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities following standard treatment of log-linear 
regressions.  In all the model estimates reported, the base variables of the gravity model (i.e., 
distance, economy size, land area, population) as well as the additional geographic and 
historical variables included in model variants are highly statistically significant and have the 
expected sign.  Our estimation results are generally consistent (both in sign and in magnitude 
of the trade effects estimated for individual variables) with those obtained in the published 
literature.
30  The robustness of model estimates to the addition of new variables is indicated 
28 The distance variable had the expected negative sign (-0.953) and was statistically significant at a 99 percent 
level of confidence; however the overall R2for this simple model was only 3.9 percent.  We noted that Ng and 
Yeats (op. cit.) use the trade intensity index rather than real value of exports as the left hand side variable in 
their regression.
29 As noted at the bottom of Table two, the “R-square” statistics reported for random effects GLS estimates 
differs from the R-square computer in regular OLS regression and has slightly different properties, however its 
interpretation is similar (see STATA, 2003, p. 194-195).  
30 See, for example, results reported in Frankel and Romer (1999), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Clarete et al. 
(2003), Rose (2004), and Yamarik and Ghosh (2005).  Our results are most similar to those of Rose, but share 
common signs and levels of statistical significance with the estimates reported in all of these papers with the 
exception of the variables for population and contiguous borders which obtain estimation coefficients that vary 
across the papers. 
33by the similarity of individual parameter estimates obtained across models 1 to 4.  Distance 
between countries has the largest negative association with level of trade, while economy size 
(GDP) has a largest positive association with trade levels.  Countries with larger land 
endowments are found to trade at significantly lower levels, while population was associated 
with lower imports and greater exports.  Lastly among variables included in the base gravity 
model, countries with unchanging borders throughout the period 1980 to 2002 have 
significantly higher levels of trade than new nations or countries experiencing boundary 
changes.
Three of the models also include additional variables capturing aspects of their 
geography that influences their level of foreign trade as expected.  Landlocked countries 
have significantly lower levels of trade in terms of both exports and imports, but the 
magnitude of the associated estimation parameter is relatively small.  Countries sharing 
contiguous borders trade at significantly higher levels, as expected, and the magnitude of the 
associated estimation parameter was large.  Small island countries engage in foreign trade at 
significantly higher rates than other countries, although the associated estimation parameter 
was relatively small.
Lastly, the last two estimation models (3 and 4) added variables capturing historical 
and linguistic ties between the trading partners to the estimation equation.  Countries having 
a common language, as expected, tend to trade at higher levels then other countries, and the 
positive effect was large (i.e. roughly the same magnitude as sharing contiguous borders).  
The three variables indicating previous colonial linkages or share colonial histories between 
the trading countries each have a positive and statistically significant effect on trade levels.  
This suggests that countries that have undergone periods of colonial domination tend to 
have a stronger orientation towards foreign trade than non-colonized countries and 
countries with colonial ties historically tend to have strong trade ties to the present day.   
Estimation parameters from model 4 are used to calculate the level of trade expected 
based on country-pair characteristics.  The predicted trade levels provide a counterfactual 
against which actual trade levels can be compared to judge whether two countries trade to a 
greater or lesser extent than one would expect given their characteristics.   The predicted 
trade level is also used to calculate the trade intensity index, which compared to the actual 
trade intensity index.  Deviations between predicted and actual trade are interpreted as 
reflections of policy and other effects not captured in the gravity model on bilateral trade.  
We also estimate our gravity model using standard linear regression on single year 
cross-sections of our dataset.  Although less efficient estimator in terms of taking advantage 
of the larger sample size and longitudinal nature of the available data, these estimates are 
undertaken because they provide insight into the evolution of variables influencing trade 
over time and provide results with more familiar and simpler interpretation.  Results from 
five year intervals of the single year cross-sectional estimates (i.e., 1985, 1990, and so on) are 
summarized on Appendix Table 3.  Examination of the results from these single-year 
estimates highlights the robustness of the panel results, as most of the variables in the model 
maintain the sign and statistical significance obtained in the panel estimates (e.g. distance 
between countries has a large and statistically significant coefficient in all years).  Overall, 
these estimates perform well in terms of explaining cross-sectional variation in bilateral trade 
34flows; R-square statistics range between 62 percent and 70 percent, and all models are 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level.   
The magnitudes of most of the right hand side variables included in the model are 
either steady or fluctuate without any clear pattern; however, some exceptions to this are 
worth discussing.  We note that the estimated coefficients for distance steadily increase over 
the years covered in our dataset, which may reflect the increasing importance of intra-
regional trade which has coincided with the major upturn in global trade volumes since the 
mide-1990s.  Small island countries had export/import levels comparable to other countries 
prior to 1995, but after that year small island status was associated with a statistically 
significant propensity to export (but not to import).  This may suggest that small island 
countries have experienced a disproportionate increase in their exports since the mid-1990s.  
A country’s landlocked status, in contrast, was associated with significantly lower levels of 
exports after 1995, which suggests landlocked countries may have been left out of the surge 
in global trade relative to countries with access to the sea.  Estimation coefficients for the 
variables capturing past colonial ties displayed some evidence that such ties may be declining 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Appendix Table 2. Panel Estimates of Total Exports (random-effects GLS regression)
Coefficient Estimate
Estimated Standard Error































































































 * denotes significant at a 90% confidence level, 
** denotes signif. at a 95% confidence level, 
          
*** denotes significant at a 99% confidence level.
Source: Authors' estimates using data from sources documented in Appendix Table 1.
3839
Appendix Table 2. Panel Estimates of Total Exports (concluded)
Coefficient Estimate
Estimated Standard Error
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
other paramters of the estimation model
sigma_u 1.720 1.707 1.677 1.678
sigma_e 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124
rho 0.701 0.698 0.690 0.690
Theta (minimum) 0.453 0.450 0.443 0.443
Theta (median) 0.828 0.827 0.824 0.824
Theta (maximum) 0.848 0.847 0.844 0.844
No.obs. (N) 180,275 180,275 180,275 180,275








     Ave.yrs./country-pair 12 12 12
R
2                                        /1 0.653 0.657 0.667









     Degree of freedom 8 13 17
Notes:
 * denotes significant at a 90% confidence level, 
** denotes signif. at a 95%
          
*** denotes si
 confidence level, 
gnificant at a 99% confidence level.
/1This R
2statistic differs from the standard OLS R
2 and has slightly different prope
 but its interpretation is equivalent (see Stata Corp. (2003), p.194-5 for details).
Source: Authors' estimates using data from sources documented in Appendix Ta
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